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Abstract: The source of violations of human rights in Punjab lies in its manifold complexities of a conflict-
ridden society. The articulation of human rights becomes an extremely challenging and tangled enterprise in a 
society with a long history of sectarian divisions. Punjab has witnessed a political cycle of violent and peaceful 
conflict between the state and its opponents. This article has focused on three periods, as described below, of 
violent conflict between the state and the forces opposed to the state. While it is cavalier to think that militant 
politics would never re-emerge in Punjab, the state’s capacity to absorb political stress and endure democratic 
means in the period since the extirpation of political militancy has been strong enough.  
           The research has heavily depended on books as primary source for this research. Besides that, 
newspapers, magazines, internet has provided secondary references as far as data collection is concerned. The 
study has used the standard historical analytical method of political analysis. This article finds that Punjab has 
experienced various ups and downs in its political history and human rights violations have been a major factor 
in shaping its politics where democratic forces have been equally important. Punjab has witnessed political 
violence under special circumstances. Its history in between these periods has been largely tranquil with few 
political killings and human rights abuses. This study has shown that most human rights violations occur in the 
hands of the state; the more draconian the state becomes the more violent are the repercussions. 
KEYWORDS:  Political violence, human rights, violation, terrorism, Khalistan, militancy, killings. 
Punjab has played a major role in the history of India. It had fallen victim to internal intrigues and British 
mechanizations. After two Anglo-Sikh wars which were cut short early, Punjab was finally annexed to the 
British empire in 1849. However, the British, who pursued the policy of divide and rule’, created differences 
between the three communities (Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs) by playing off one community against the other. 
But the people of Punjab rose above their religious differences in their struggle for freedom of India. Though the 
people of Punjab managed their differences, the British inroad into Punjab society transformed it forever.1 A 
brief summary of some of the major academic writings on Punjab needs to be highlighted at this juncture. For 
instance, the edited volume by Lakhwinder Singh Sidhu, Gurpreet Singh Brar and Sumandeep Kaur Punia 
examines the various aspects of Punjab politics, viz. the party factionalism, splits;mergers and defections; the 
electoral politics of the state since the Assembly election held in 1967, the politics of coalitions and alliances; 
the delicate issue of Sikh militancy; the Parliamentary elections in the state; and, concludes with noting some of 
the emerging trends and patterns in the politics of the state and summarily also touches the changing socio-
economic profile of Punjab and its likely political implications. Bhupinder Singh’s Punjab Politics: Retrospect 
and Prospect is a unique addition to the existing literature on the subject.2 The book provides a fascinating 
journey towards learning the changing dynamics of state politics in particular, and, to understand multi-fold 
intricacies of Centre-State relations and working of Indian federalism in general. Besides, it discusses electoral 
politics as well. Jagdish Kumar’s book is based on archival sources and contemporary vernacular periodicals, 
traces the roots of communal politics from the late nineteenth century when religious identities were being 
constructed and institutionalized in the backdrop of colonial challenges.3 This process not only happened in 
socio-cultural domain but also occurred in the political realm where political institutions were used as leverage 
to enhance specific ‘community’ interests. Punjab became a victim of communal politics and paid a very heavy 
price on the eve of partition of India into two nation states. Here an attempt is made to trace the trajectory of 
communal politics that landed Punjab into such a catastrophe that had never been seen in the history of mankind. 
Sumandeep Kaur Punia’s work is primarily a study of emerging trends and changing patterns of electoral 
                                                          
1 Lakhwinder Singh Sidhu, Gurpreet Singh Brar and Sumandeep Kaur Punia, eds., Politics in Punjab 1966-
2008, Chandigarh : Unistar Books Pvt Ltd, 2009.  
2 Bhupinder Singh,  Punjab Politics: Retrospect and Prospect, New Delhi : Readworthy Publications Pvt Ltd, 
2010,   
3 Jagdish Kumar, Communal Politics in the Punjab,  Chandigarh : Unistar publications, 2010 
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politics in Punjab from 1967 to 2007.4 The study shows how politics in the state has undergone a paradigmatic 
shift during this period as post-1997 elections have shown a distinct shift of focus from ethno-religious issues to 
secular and development-oriented issues. Moreover, the study delves into the meaning, role and significance of 
elections in a democratic polity and the electoral system in India. It provides an analysis of party manifestoes, 
electoral issues; party performance and changes in support base of major political parties in the state. Pritam 
Singh’s book titled Economy, Culture and Human Rights is an important work to understand human rights as 
intrinsically important rather than simply as a means to achieve a given set of economic or political goals.5 The 
book describes how the politico–economic framework established by the British in Punjab resulted in 
intensification of conflicts over material interests. This scenario provided an impetus for the transformation of 
pre-British religious differences into a sharp political antagonism on religious lines. Punjab was distinctly 
different in pre-colonial set up. The encouragement given the colonial authority resulted in the segmentation of a 
society into many hostile groups who vied against each other for political power and insisted for their religious 
separateness. 
 The Punjab agitation had causes both distant and proximate. A section of the Sikh intelligentsia hoped 
for the renewal, in some shape or form, of the Sikh state ruled by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the first half of the 
19
th
 century. Others looked only as far back as partition, and the tragedies and losses suffered by the community 
then. The state of Punjab had to pay a very heavy price for secessionist politics on the eve of Independence 
when it was sliced into two parts. After the partition of Punjab, the Congress came to command an absolute 
majority in the state legislative assembly which consisted of seventy nine members. Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava 
took over the reins of administration as Chief Minister of east Punjab Province, on the direction of Sarder Patel. 
After its merger with Akali Dal, the strength of the Congress rose from seventy-one to seventy-nine members.6 
The Congress at that time was badly faction-ridden. There were two vital groups – the Bhargava group and the 
Sachar group, each with an equal number of supporters. Nehru was infuriated at Bhargava’s defiance of the high 
command. Finally, he was asked by Nehru to resign. However, since the Sachar-Kairon faction was in a 
minority, it failed to form an alternate ministry. President’s Rule was clamped on the state on June 20, 1951 and 
lifted on April 4, 1952. The imposition of President’s Rule was criticized by the opposition parties who said that 
it had been used as a political weapon and that it denied that majority group its rights to rule the state.7            
The President’s rule could not control political violence. The number of incidents of violence kept increasing 
after the imposing of President’s rule in the state. There were more incidents of bank robberies, theft of 
weapons, cutting the telegraph wires, burning of the railway stations, attacks on policemen, bomb explosions, 
murder of Nirankaris, killing of public officials, and attack on the ministers. There was also the breaking of 
idols, damage to temples, sacrilege of Gurudwaras, firing on Hindu shopkeepers, killing of cigarette sellers, 
firing on Jagrata and Ram Lila crowds, and indiscriminate firing on people. There was also mob violence in 
Haryana.8 Sant Bhindranwale, began to operate from the Golden Temple complex, and instigated violence and 
advocated the killing of Hindus. In the last weeks of 1983 Bhindranwale took up residence in Akal Takht that 
the great Gurus issued their hukumnamas, edicts that all Sikhs were obliged to follow and honour.That 
Bhindranwale chose now to move into the Akal Takht, and that no one had the courage to stop him, were acts 
steeped in the most dangerously profound symbolism.  
 Punjab appeared to be at a communal boiling point in the spring of 1984. The Punjab crisis lingered 
and escalated as a result of these continuing “patterns of political leadership.” Yet, the relationship between the 
Akalis and “the extremists”, and between the Akali Dal and Mrs. Gandhi’s Congress (I) government, 
transformed in a fundamental way during the course of this period. Regarding the former, the Akali Dal and 
Bhindranwale had been in a tenuous but largely mutually-symbiotic relationship since the beginning of the 
DharamYudhMorcha. But, by the spring of 1984, Bhindranwale had usurped the Akalis’ traditional positions as 
the premier source of Sikh leadership in Punjab, thus turning the Akalis (both “moderates” and “radicals” alike) 
against him. Not only did the Akalis become antithetical to Bhindranwale, but Mrs. Gandhi also began to 
perceive the need to act aggressively against “the extremists” to avoid losing precious Hindu support in north 
India.  
                                                          
4 Sumandeep Kaur Punia, Electoral Politics in Punjab: Emerging Trends and Changing Patterns (1966-2009), 
New Delhi : Mohit Publications, 2009 
5 Pritam Singh, Economy, Culture and Human Rights: Turbulence in Punjab, India and Beyond, Haryana : 
Three Essays Collective, 2011.  
6 Sumandeep Kaur Punia, n.4, pp. 18-19. 
7 Ibid., p. 21. 
8 Bhupinder Singh, n.2, p. 63. Also see, J.S Grewal, n.10, pp. 203-204. 
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 For these reasons, Mrs. Gandhi ordered the Indian Army to raid the Golden Temple complex in June 
1984 in operation Bluestar. The army was ordered to move into the Golden Temple. The whole Punjab was 
completely scaled off from the rest of the country by the Indian army. The troops equipped with tanks and heavy 
amour surrounded the Golden Temple curfew was imposed throughout Punjab. The Akal Takhat, the seat of 
temporal authority of the Sikhs was completely destroyed. Nearly 200 army personnel and 400 militants 
including Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale lost their lives. The military operation injured badly the religious 
sentiments and self-respect of the Sikhs and led to far-reaching consequences. The operation was “successful” in 
eliminating Bhindranwale, but it also embittered and alienated Sikhs throughout India. Mrs. Gandhiand the 
Akalis had solved one problem – Bhindranwale – but they had also potentially created another one – the basis 
for a separatist ethno-nationalist insurgency in Punjab. The military action at Golden Temple could not eliminate 
militancy in Punjab. Rather, it added fuel to the fire. Militants started making the demand for Khalistan more 
forcefully than ever before. Martial law was imposed, thousands of Sikhs died, thousands were arrested, and 
civil liberties of the state were by and large suspended.9 As a result active armed resistance against the Indian 
state began for the first time in Sikh-Centre relations. On 31
st
 October 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by 
two Punjabi Sikh guards from her own security force presumably in retaliation for the attack on the Golden 
Temple. 
 This unleashed an orgy of indiscriminate killings. Events were moving towards a tragic collision. On 1
st
 
November, 1984, reports started emerging of large-scale killings of Sikhs and the burning of their gurdwaras 
and business net only in Delhi but in many other towns of north India.  In Delhi and its neighbourhood it was 
believed that 4000 – 5000 Sikhs were killed. Out of them, 5 – 10 percent was burnt alive. 50 – 60000 people 
(Sikhs) … had been rendered homeless and subjected to unspeakable humiliation and torture:10 The operation 
Bluestar was first of its kind, in which seven divisions of the army were deployed and all three wings of the 
armed forces – the army the navy and the air force – were brought in to suppress an internal rebellion. As many 
as 13 tanks were used in the attack. Estimates of persons killed vary from 493, according to the government of 
India white paper, to over 8000, according to another estimate. The most reliable is an estimate by Khuswant 
Singh, who writes that ‘in the cross-fire upwards of 5000 people, a majority of them pilgrims, including women 
and children lost their lives’11 
 Mrs. Gandhi’s assassinations sparked a massive Hindu backlash against Sikhs throughout India. In 
many cities, especially in Delhi, the civil administration simply broke down partially due to the police’s apathy. 
The deployment of the Army was delayed for four days, rising suspicious that the highest levels of the congress 
(I) government deliberately refrained from ending the progress in order to teach the Sikhs “a lesson”. While 
anti-Sikh violence raged in the rest of North India, Punjab remained relatively calm as over 80000 military and 
paramilitary troops sealed the state and barred any traffic from either entering or learning.12 In fact, a 
“surface calm” prevailed in Punjab after operation Bluestar. Indian Express described the atmosphere as 
follows– 
 ‘A deep anguish pervades in the country side. People say they have been humiliated but at the same 
time express their helplessness. They simply do not know how to react. For the time being they have come to 
terms with the situation. Every villager this reporter talked to … expressed strong views … [they] do not know 
whom to look to13 It was easy to play political blame game in such a situation especially to hold the then 
Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi responsible for the tragic operation Bluestar that unfolded in Punjab. But 
without such convoluted thinking one might wonder whether any Prime Minister would opt to willfully continue 
with a situation which reveals her complete impotence as the Punjab situation did for so long. The tough stand 
prospered by the Centre meant not only steadfastness in the face of Akali demands but also positive action to 
deal with lawlessness.14 The Government of India’s “White paper on the Punjab Agitation”: (1984) observes: 
 “The terrorists escalated their violence. With each passing day the situation worsened. The subversive 
activities of groups inside the Golden Temple Complex had assumed menacing proportions in the context of 
                                                          
9 Jugdeep S Chima, “The Punjab Crisis: Government Centralization and Akali-Centre Relations,” Asian Survey, 
Vol. 34, No 10, 1994, p.854. 
10 Amrik Singh, ed., Punjab in Indian Politics, Delhi : Ajanta publications, 1985, p. 321 
11 Pritam Singh, ‘The Political Economy of the Cycles of Violence and Non-Violence in the Sikh Struggle for 
Identity and Political Power: implications for Indian Federalism’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No.3, 2007, 
p. 561. 
12 Jugdeep S. Chima, n.11, pp. 108-109.  
13 “Surface calm in Punjab,” Indian Express, 15th June, 1984. 
14 Surinder S. Jodhka, ‘Return of the Region: Identities and Electoral politics in Punjab’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. 40, Issue No. 10, Jan 15, 2005, pp. 225-226 
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India’s security environment. The influence of external forces, with deep-rooted interest in the disintegration of 
India, was becoming evident. The Government was convinced that this challenge to the security, unity and 
integrity of the country would not be met by the normal law and order agencies at the disposal of the state.”15  
 At a time when a paradigm shift was taking place in the rest of the country, which Indian political 
scientists described as a move from ‘politics of ideology’ to ‘politics of representation’; Punjab was 
experiencing a very different trajectory. The rise of the Khalistani movement was a rather unexpected 
development. Khalistan was perhaps never a part of the popular imagination of the Sikhs living in Punjab but 
acquired a different magnitude primarily because of the manner in which it was ‘handled’ that led to complete 
depoliticisation of the social life and the institutions of governance.  
 There had never been any doubts about the nationalist credentials of the Sikhs. Not surprisingly 
therefore, the rise of a secessionist movement in the state was a puzzle for many. From political economy to 
modernization theory, to psychoanalysis, the academia applied virtually every available framework and 
perspective for understanding and explaining the ‘crisis.’ Tough militancy declined after a period of time and 
local politicians began to come out in support of peace initiatives, the implications of the crisis were far too 
many – for the Sikh community and for the staff of Punjab too. The age-old Hindu-Sikh unity was put on test in 
this troubled period. According to available estimates, more than 25000 people, a large majority of whom were 
Sikhs, had lost their lives in Punjab and elsewhere in India, in the violence linked to the ‘crisis’. Impact was 
mostly felt on the state economy and there were changes in the social life of the people. More importantly, it 
quite fundamentally transformed the popular image of Punjab. From a state known for its economic vibrancy 
and progress, Punjab began to the seen as a ‘crisis ridden’ region with serious problems of law and order and 
political unrest.  
 Politically also this prolonged phase of violence was quite negative for the state. Almost every political 
formation lost credibility with the common people of Punjab was scared of even talking about politics. The 
prevailing mood was expressed in the words of Dipankar Gupta, “Punjab today represents a picture of hard to 
believe placidity.”16  This silence did not mean indifference to politics. Common Sikhs were angry with the 
then dominant political formation, the Congress Party. This anger was directly reflected in the electoral politics 
during the period. The events that occurred and electoral politics were intrinsically and intimately related and 
influenced each other. These developments made democratic institutions and processes irrelevant. It was only 
around the late 1990s that the political process limped back to normal. Interestingly, though ‘the crises’ virtually 
paralyzed all normal political activity and security forces were given all kinds of special powers to enable them 
to suppress militancy in a border state of the country, electoral politics was not completely suspended in the state 
despite the prevalence of these special conditions.  
 The first major initiative to restore peace and revive electoral politics in the Punjab was taken up in 
1985 when Rajiv Gandhi, India’s new prime minister, revived the dialogue process with the ‘Moderate’ Akalis 
and eventually signed an accord with them in July 1985. This agreement is popularly known as Punjab Accord 
or Rajib-Longowal Accord. According to this accord, Chandigarh was to be transferred to Punjab on or before 
January 26, 1986.  
An autonomous commission was to be appointed to settle the territorial claims of Punjab and Haryana. 
The final territorial exchange between Punjab and Haryana was to take place on January 26, 1986 and a tribunal, 
presided over by a Justice of the Supreme Court, was to make an allocation of river water between Punjab, 
Haryana and Rajasthan. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution, which demanded restructuring of the Centre-state 
relationship, was referred to the Sarkaria Commission. On July 26, 1985, RajibLongwal Treaty was approved by 
an overwhelming majority of more than 250 Akali delegates and the district party leaders. The agreement 
resulted in the termination of the Akali agitation.  
 Actually, Rajiv Gandhi who succeeded as prime minister, moved firmly, bringing an end to the anti-
Sikh riots. Rajiv’s perceptionsof the Akali politics and the Punjab crisis were different from his mother. He 
appeared to make a clear distinction between the approach of the moderate Akali politicians and the Sikh 
extremists and the secessionists. In more than 50 years of their history, Akalis had never used terrorist method to 
achieve their political goal. Thus, Sikh terrorism was a new phenomenon and it was necessary to separate it 
from Akali politics. The basic strategy of Rajiv Gandhi was to isolate the extremist and to bring the moderate 
Akali leadership to the negotiation table. However, the signing of this accord turned out to be premature. The 
militants assassinated SantLongowal on August 20, 1985, its signatory from Punjab. This incident raised doubts 
in some quarters about the wisdom of holding elections. (bothLok Sabha and Assembly) scheduled to be held on 
                                                          
15 C.P. Bhambhri, Political process in India. 1947 – 1991, New Delhi : Vikas Publishing House, 1991, p. 45 
16 Surinder S Jodhka, n. 30, p. 225 
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nd
 September, 1985. The government ultimately decided and all parties in the state accepted to confront the 
challenging situation squarely and salvage from it a democratic existence.  
 The elections were held in 1985 and it surprisingly witnessed quite an enthusiastic participation. An 
estimated 66.5% of the total eligible voter turned-up for voting, a ratter impressive turnout even for normal 
times. And this was despite the call for boycott given by the radical factions of Akalis and the All India Sikh 
students Federation (AISSF). The moderate faction of Akalis won in these elections with a massive majority. In 
the 117 member state assembly, they were victorious in as many as 73 seats. The enthusiasm of the voters, 
particularly from the villages, surprised even the cynics amongst observers. It confirmed that the people of 
Punjab wanted to live in peace and they were in favour of the restoration of the democratic process. The 
Congress suffered an overall loss of 7.29% of voters in 1985. It was for the first time in the history of the Akali 
Dal that it formed a government in Punjab without having to align with any other party. 
 Surjit Singh Barnala was sworn in as the Chief Minister of Punjab on September 29, 1985. The Akali 
government under him had to face many challenges. Especially, the Central government was not very helpful. It 
developed cold feet towards the Barnala government. None of the major clauses of the Punjab Accord were 
implemented. In the meantime Haryana assembly elections were declared. Rajiv Gandhi had been lending an ear 
to Bhajanlal, Chief Minister of Haryana, and come to the conclusion that if he gives Chandigarh to Punjab then 
he would lose the Hindu votes in Haryana elections. So to appease the Haryana electorate, the Central 
government, dismissed Barnala government in May 1987 on the pretext that he was unable to put down the 
terrorism in his state, and President’s Rule was imposed in Punjab. The assembly was formally dissolved in 
March 1988.17 The treatment meted out to the moderate Akalileader, Surjit Singh Barnala, by the Central 
government and the non-implementation of the Rajiv-longowal Accord had a direct impact on the internal 
politics of the Akalis and the Sikh communality. The moderates lost out to the radicals. When elections were 
held to the Lok Sabha in 1989, it was the radical faction of Akalis which gained the upper hand. Moderate Akali 
groups could not get a single seat this time round. Military continued to grow, until the early 1990s. Even the top 
police officer, KPS Gill acknowledged the failure of the security forces in containing militancy. “The years 1990 
and 1991 unambiguously belonged to the terrorists.” he admitted.18 
 Between 1989 and 1992, the insurgency movement by the Sikh militants campaigning for Khalistan, a 
separate Sikh state was at its peak and threatened the security forces and sidelined the moderates in the Akali 
Dal, the mainstream Sikh political party.  President’s rule lasted until February 1992, having set up a ‘quasi-
militarizedsituation with a de-facto police raj’.19 A series of special laws, not only suspended the political 
process in the state, but empowered the security forces to take measures to contain disorder and insurgency. The 
state was mixed in a terrible state of virtual civil war conditions.  
 In the meanwhile, there was also a regime change in New Delhi. The Congress Party lost the 1989 
parliamentary elections and V.P Singh of the Janata Dal became the prime minister. V.P. Singh’s “National 
Front” was the first non-congress government in power in the Centre since the Janata government of 1977. He 
visited the Golden Temple and promised to renew the dialogue and political process. V.P. Singh did not offer 
any immediate political solutions, but his visit demonstrated, at least symbolically, an apparent change in the 
attitude of the Central government toward the “Punjab problem” by taking it away from a policy of 
confrontation. 
 Though V.P. Singh’s government did not last long, his successor, Chandra Sekhar reaffirmed the 
promise made by Singh, while also trying to stay firm on violence. During his brief tenure as Prime Minister, 
Chandra Sekhar first sent the army to contain militant violence and opened a dialogue with the radical Sikh 
leadership.When the radical Sikh leadership hesitated, he made a direct approach to smaller militant groups. 
These talks resulted in a secret deal in which Chandra Sekhar sought to restore the democratic process by 
holding the Lok  Sabha and State elections in Punjab just after the 10
th
 General elections in May-June 1991. 
However, when general elections were held for the Lok Sabha in the country in 1991, Punjab was not found 
suitable for revival of the democratic process. Interestingly, different factions of the Akalis were in the fray. 
These groups set up candidates for these elections. But the congress (I) anticipating defeat boycotted these 
elections and also several militant organizations opposed it. In the meantime Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated. 
Towards the end of the campaign the level of violence escalated dramatically. Barely 36 hours before the polls, 
                                                          
17 Sumandeep Kaur Pumia, n. 4, pp. 66-67.  
18 Surinder S Jodhka, n. 30, p. 226. 
19 Gurharpal Singh, Communism in Punjab: a study of the movement up to 1967, New Delhi :Ajanta 
Publications, 1994, p. 411. Cited in Subrata K Mitra, The Puzzle of India’s Governance: Culture, Context and 
Comparative Theory, New York : Routledge, 2006, p. 95 
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had the Election commission decided to postpone the holding of elections in Punjab.20 It was strongly felt that 
there was no wisdom in cancellation of the Punjab poll. It was unjust ably called off at the last minute, simply 
because the non-Congress victory was otherwise certain.’21 A couple of months after the Congress formed its 
government at the Centre under the leadership of PV Narasimha Rao, it decided to hold elections in Punjab 
though militancy was not yet defeated. Rao reappointed KPS Gill as the head of the Punjab Police who had a 
previous record of successful action against militants, terrorists and militant groups and gangs in Punjab under 
the National Front Government. However, militancy continued to grow until the early 1990s. Even the top 
police officer KPS Gill acknowledged the failure of the security forces in containing militancy. “The years 1990 
and 1991 unambiguously belonged to the terrorists”, he admitted.22  However elections to the state assembly 
and to the Parliament were finally held in Punjab in February 1992 under the shadow of guns. These elections 
were not normal elections. They, one the one hand were referendum on two different modes of politics – the 
democratic mode and the terrorist mode. Although, nominally, the contest was between candidates of different 
parties, but the real adversaries in the tray were Indian democracy on one side and terrorism on the other side.23 
 The army was deployed to help civil administration to conduct elections peacefully. However, the 
political climate had deteriorated significantly by then. Moderate Akalis saw their marginalization in Punjab 
politics as being a direct result of the policies of the Congress governments at the Centre. When the congress 
government at the Centre decided in favour of holding elections, the Akali showed no enthusiasm. Along with 
different groups of militants they too gave a call for boycott. While justifying the Akali decision of the boycott, 
Prakash Singh Badal stated that: “We are for total boycott and exposure of the center’s mechanizations against 
Punjab.”24 
 The situation was such that it drew politics in the direction of indeterminacy. The extraordinariness of 
the elections themselves, held as they were amidst violence and the call for a boycott, shaped the rhetoric and 
the electoral strategy of political parties. The first major bone of contention between the two main parties: the 
Akali Dal and the Congress was whether the elections should be held at all. Polling was held under strong 
security. However, the boycott call by the Akalis was also very effective. A little less than 24% of all the 
registered voters turned up for voting on the day of the polling. Overwhelming majority of Sikh voters refrained 
from voting. Congress had virtually no opposition, except from the BahujanSamaj Party which attracted 
substantial number of voters. Congress candidates won from as many as 87 of the 117 assembly seats. The party 
formed a government under the leadership of Beant Singh as Chief Minister. 
 The installation of an elected government had far reaching implications for the state’s politics during 
the 1990s. Firstly, the low electoral turn out cast a damper on the legitimacy of the new government. It was more 
a vote for rejection than election. Secondly, there was a legitimacy deficit for the Congress which made the 
restoration of normalcy and returns of peace to the state its main concern. The only problem is that it defined 
restoration of ‘normalcy and peace’ strictly in political terms; the agenda had no place for the social or economic 
reconstruction of the state. Both the demands of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and the promised economic 
package for the state remained unfulfilled and undelivered.25   
In the post 1992 election scenario the issue of peace was to dominate state politics for many years to 
come as the Akalis were trying to put their own house in order. They had to regain the political ground that had 
been appropriated by the militants in the 1980s in order to compete with the Congress. The Akali Dal (Badal) 
aligned with the Bahujan Samaj Party. It also aligned with the Bharatiya Janata Party which had far reaching 
consequences.26 The dynamics of the state politics of Punjab which manifests in the electoral mobilization in 
the state has been characterized by the continuation of alliances and coalition politics since the 1960s. 1990s 
also witnessed the same trend along with it there was the ‘grandaunt’ discarding of radical stances by political 
parties all over the state’. This has been evident in the form of the manifestoes of Akali Dal and its ally BJP to 
maintain peace, brotherhood, communal harmony, socio-economic welfare, all round development and 
sustainable and profitable, agriculture through diversification’.27 All parties made the right kind of noises in 
terms of development but it was clear that politics and policy alike were concerned with peace defined narrowly 
                                                          
20 Surinder S. Jodhaka, n. 30, p. 226 
21 Sumandeep Kaur Pumia, n. 4, p. 67,  
22 Surinder S. Jodhka, n. 30, p.226. 
23 Sumandeep Kaur Punia, n.4, p. 61 
24 Lakhwinder Singh Sidhu, et. al, n.1, p. 339. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Surinder S. Jodhka, n.30, p. 227. 
27 Ashutosh Kumar, n. 8, p. 1519 
 
ISSN: 2321-8819 (Online) 2348-7186 (Print) Impact Factor: 1.498 Vol. 5, Issue 8, August 2017 
113 
Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, 5(8) August, 2017 
 
  
  
 
 
 
as the elimination of militancy.The de-escalation of Sikh militancy in Punjab was surely the order of the day. 
India Today described the emerging situation as follows – ‘The venders of terror (the militants) have cleared 
pack up. The guns are there but they belong to the police.’28 
 In February 1993, Punjab police Chief KPS Gill had confidently announced that militancy had been 
crushed in Punjab. Through the year, the police had killed 794 suspect militants, arrested 970 and 379 
voluntarily surrendered. The most telling figure demonstrating the decline of insurgency was the relatively small 
number of people killed by “the militants” in 1993: only 24 civilians and 23 Security force personnel. In 
contrast, the comparative figures for 1992 had been 1,266 and 252.29 However, in the troubled political 
condition of Punjab, the proper support that was gained by Beant Singh’s Congress (I) government was quickly 
eroding for several reasons. Firstly, the crowning achievement of Beant Singh’s government-- the apparent 
“crushing” of Sikh militancy – was quickly fading into the background as other, mostly economic, issues were 
becoming more salient in Punjab’s political discourse. Secondly, corruptionhad become so rampant in Beant 
Singh’s government that many cabinet ministers were either being investigated for misdeeds or were actually 
facing criminal charges. Thirdly, Beant Singh was losing his unchallenged control over Punjab’s Congress (I) 
party as new, younger leaders were quickly emerging to the forefront of the organization. Lastly, in an 
increasingly post-militancy Punjab, the Punjab Police had failed to revert back to more “normal” modes of 
operation.30  
 Along with the militants, many innocent persons were killed. It was reported in 1992 that police 
excesses and high-handedness continued unabated with the implicit approval of the Centre. The security forces 
were given a ‘free hand’ to curb the militancy in the state. The lure of awards induced the security personnel to 
take the chance of killing the innocent persons in the name of ‘terrorists’. In a number of cases the relatives of 
militants were tortured to death. Under the command of ‘super cop’ K.P.S. Gill, the police resorted to 
unprecedented illegalities and atrocities. The United States government described the Punjab police practice of 
faked encounter killings in 1993, “In the typical scenario, police take into custody a suspected militant or 
militant supporter without filing an arrest report. If the detainee dies during interrogation or is executed, officials 
deny he was ever in custody and claim he died during an armed encounter with police or security forces. 
Alternatively, police may claim to have been ambushed by militants while escorting a suspect. Although the 
detainee invariably dies in “crossfire,” police casualties in these incidents are rare.31 Fake police encounters 
were frequently reported. The bodies of thousands were cremated by the police declaring those as unclaimed.32 
There were major violations of human rights in the state in the name of curbing the Sikh militancy. The fight 
against the militants became a fight against all political opponents and, often, same methods were used 
indiscriminately against all. Instead of adopting any political approach to solve the Punjab situation the Central 
government resorted to crush any opposition in the state with ruthless use and abuse, retaliation against their 
opponents and the allies of the Indian state was no less brutal.33  
The entire effort of the administration during Governor’s rule was directed towards crushing the Sikh 
insurgency; little thought was given to rejuvenate the democratic political process in the state. Development of 
the industrial and service sector suffered a setback and the realization of the Punjab economy was further 
strengthened. The government of India eventually succeeded in crushing Sikh militancy, but paying a very 
heavy human cost. The majority of Punjabi Sikhs who died in the battle between the Indian security forces and 
Sikh guerrilla organizations were young men in the prime of their productive life span. The range, intensity and 
the scale of human rights violations were unprecedented in Punjab’s post-independence history.34  
 Despite such violence, the people of Punjab, over the years returned to electoral politics and began to 
take part in the democratic process of a country with immense enthusiasm. The Lok Sabha elections held in 
1996 were first ‘normal’ elections after a long period of turmoil. These elections are very significant as these 
represented the psyche of people. The important aspect of the 1996 Lok Sabha elections was that the people and 
the political parties of all shades enthusiastically participated in the elections for the first time after the end of 
militancy in the state. The fear of violence had practically gone and the people of Punjab fearlessly used their 
                                                          
28 Kanwar Sandhu, “Punjab: Normal Life at Last.” India Today, 28 February 1993, p. 40 
29 Ibid., pp. 240-241. 
30 Jugdeep S. Chima, n. 11, p. 242. 
31 Human Rights Watch and Ensaaf report titled ‘Protecting the Killers: A Policy of Impunity in Punjab, India, 
Vol. 19, No 14(c), October 2007, p.16 . Source: 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/india1007webwcover.pdf  
32  Ibid, pp. 16-18 
33  Pritam Singh, n. 27, p. 565. 
34 Pritam Singh, n. 5, pp. 138-139. 
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right to vote. Around 62.25 percent of the people voted this time as against 23.69 percent in 1992 elections. The 
main reason for the massive turnout was the people’s assertion of their faith in the democratic mode for the 
redressing their grievances and also due to the return of competitive politics in Punjab after twelve years.35  
 In the following year when elections to the state assembly were held, ‘peace’ continued to be the core 
issue. The 1997 assembly elections were held in normal conditions, which were far removed from the hype, the 
contestation, the fear and the apathy that had marked the 1992 elections. Recognizing the changing political 
scene at the national level, and the growing significance of BJP, the Badal Akali Dal did everything possible to 
consolidate its alliance with the state unit of the BJP. It nearby abandoned its policies of regional identity and 
spoke a very different language. The alliance worked well for the Akalis. A whopping 68.7 percent of the 
registered voters  turned up for voting of the total 117 assembly seats, Akali Dal (Badal’s) candidates won as 
many as 75 seats and its partner BJP won another 18.36 The Congress party was routed with its worst electoral 
result ever. The Congress was in disarray because of the absence of the Chief Minister Beant Singh (who was 
assassinated in 1995) but also because the party found itself completely out of sync in a situation in which its 
most important achievement – that of containing militancy was not an election issue any longer.37 
 The post 1997 period in Punjab politics has been characterized by the revival of the democratic process 
in the state after the political wilderness of the eighties. Punjab was back to normal, secular and development 
oriented issues as Panthic, emotional and identity related agendas were no more dominant in the electoral 
politics of the state.38 Nearly two decades after its brush with ‘terrorism’, democracy made a robust return in 
the state and proved the validity of elections. Both major political parties made overall development as their poll 
plank. For the people, the real issue was ‘bread and butter’ and ‘good quality of life.’ Political parties get their 
eyes on the poor people and took poverty as an important issue. 
 To be more specific, the post 1997 Assembly elections have shown a distinct shift of focus form 
religio-political to politico-economic policies veering around the issues of performance, development and 
government. As the memories of operation Bluestar and anti-Sikh riots seem to have faded, and a new 
generation of the youth who have grown up in the post-militancy peaceful Punjab, have become voters, the 
secular criteria, such as governance and economic policies have taken precedence over the identity politics 
drawing upon the community and regional aspirations. Punjab politics has moved from emotional and identity-
related issues of development, education, unemployment, welfare of Dalits and other poor sections of the society 
and so on. Both the Congress and the Akali Dal, the major political actors of Punjab politics, had focused on 
these issues in their manifestos and their advertisement campaigns in post-1997 elections.39  
 On the eve of the 1998 parliamentary elections, different factions had called a truce. However, due to 
factionalism and infighting, the Congress party suffered a debacle. On the other hand, the Akali-BJP alliance 
was a win-win situation for the Akalis. This alliance went beyond mere electoral strategy. An era of cooperative 
federalism started. Since the anti-Congress wave persisted for a while, the Akali-BJP alliance did well once 
again.40 It was not a straight fight in Punjab between the Akali-BJP alliance and the Congress in the Lok Sabha 
elections of 1999. This time it was not smooth sailing for Akali Dal. They could retain only three seats. The 
Congress gave a severe blow to the ruling Akali-BJP coalition by wresting eight of the 13 seats. The rout of 
Akali-BJP at the hands of Congress showed the disenchantment of people with the ruling combine. The 
distinguished feature of the 1999 Lok Sabha elections in Punjab was the re-emergence of Congress in the 
electoral politics of the state. Factors that helped the Congress were the anti-incumbency wave, split in Akali 
support base leading to the break up of the party, and polarization of weaker sections who were disillusioned 
from the state government. Another major factor that helped the Congress was polarization of the rural Dalit 
vote in its favour. The Congress had been able to win its traditional support base of dalits that had weaned away 
by the Bahujan Samaj Party in the past.41 Governance became the love theme of most party manifestoes by 
2000. Actually, by the turn of the 21
st
 century, the crisis in agriculture and the state economy had accentuated so 
much that the manifestoes could ill afford to ignore this discomforting fact. Whatever were the pledges and 
promises made by the major parties, they were clearly inadequate because they failed to address the root map 
was offered by either of the parties for reviving the Punjab economy, all that was offered was sops. As a tribune 
editorial tellingly commented “with so much of shining staff on offer, who has the time to think about  issues 
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like the decline in agriculture, lack of industrial growth and deficiencies in primary sectors? Bread in not 
essential where butter is being doled out.”42  During the 2002 Assembly election, an aggressive advertisement 
campaign was launched by the Congress against the Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal and his son, accusing 
them of corruption and bartering away the interest of Punjab. The Akali Dal hit back with its own set of equally 
aggressive advertisement campaign against the Congress leaders. The Congress had come to power in 2002 on 
the plank of ‘freedom from corruption and freedom from bankruptcy’.  
 By 2004 the politics of hatred, vendetta and revenge returned to state politics through the fierce rivalry 
between Captain Amarinder Singh and Prakash Singh Badal. Apart from the unprecedented bouts of 
mudslinging allegations and counter allegations, the 2007 assembly election campaign became quite 
personalized with both the parties indulging in personal vilification through surrogate advertisements. Unfolding 
event in Punjab turns our attention to yet another feature of Punjab politics that emerged with the passage of 
time in the politics of populism. The rhetoric of populist promises was the order of the day. The contestants had 
given a short shrift to the real issues and dished out oratorical add-ons. By 2004 the provincial political class 
began to feel sufficiently confident about its political identity and was no longer bothered about its democratic 
credentials. It could once again take on a confrontationist position vis-à-vis the central government as long as it 
meant defending the interests of the common people of Punjab.43 
 It is precisely this political journey of Punjab which is so interesting. This journey, full of patterns of 
resilience, found an unprecedented move in the political history of the state when the legislative assembly of 
Punjab in its meeting of July 11, 2004 decided to annul the agreement that the state of Punjab had signed with 
the states of Haryana and Rajasthan in 1981 on distribution of river waters between the three states. The 
Termination Agreement Bill was passed unanimously by the house and was sent to the Punjab governor for his 
approval the same evening, who apparently signed it without any hesitation or consulting the union government.  
 This termination of the water-sharing agreement brought to the fore the axis of regionalist politics. 
Apart from reflecting the changing realities and discourses of politics in Punjab, this return to the region under 
the leadership of the Congress Party could also have some far-reaching implication for the political identity of 
the Congress in the state. From now on its politics will perhaps be determined more by local issues, representing 
and reflecting regional aspirations than has been the case so far.44  
Concluding Observations  
 Human rights, in theory, are universal in character. However, precisely because of the many divisions 
that exist in society and which are the sources of many politics, human rights are always vulnerable to misuse 
for partisan and sectarian ends. The vulnerability of human rights to sectarian abuses arises because as Nino 
argues, ‘human rights are instruments created by human beings’ and many human beings ‘use their fellow 
humans as just another resource, either for their own benefit or to realize peculiar visions of the absolute good.’ 
The practice of using men and women as ‘instruments’ has all the more dangerous consequences ‘if, as often 
happens, it is carried out by the powerful, by those who have access to weapons or other means of subjecting 
other people to their will on a large scale.’45 
 The source of violations of human rights in Punjab lies in its manifold complexities of a conflict-ridden 
society. The articulation of human rights becomes an extremely challenging and tangled enterprise in a society 
with a long history of sectarian divisions. Punjab has witnessed a political cycle of violent and peaceful conflict 
between the state and its opponents. This article has focused on three periods, as described below, of violent 
conflict between the state and the forces opposed to the state. In the intermediate periods between these, the 
conflict between the state and the anti-state forces remained non-violent in character. These periods were –  
1) The period of the Lal Communist party-led armed guerrilla movement from the late 1940s to the early 1950s. 
2) The period of the Maoist Naxalite movement from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s and  
3) The period of the Sikh militant movement from 1978 onwards. 
 The period of the Maoist Naxalite movement i.e. from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s – there was large 
scale and brutal violation of human rights. During this period,Akali-led coalition was in power. The mostnotable 
form of violation of human rights was the resort to what came to be called ‘encounter deaths’ of Naxalite 
activists. Most of these ‘encounter deaths’ were actually deaths in police custody. The Naxalities were also 
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subjected to various types of torture – some of them extremely brutal – such as breaking of the legs by 
hammering them with bricks and stones, inserting pins into the fingernails, releasing rats and lizards into the 
victims,’ trousers, tying them behind jeeps and dragging them along miles. In Sangrur district, the limbs of some 
Naxalite activists were crushed in a sugarcane crusher. 
During the period of the Sikh militant movement from 1978 onwards, the most violent confrontation 
between the Sikh militantsand the Indian state took place during and after the Indian army’s attack known as 
Operation Blue Star on the Golden Temple in Amritsar on 3
rd
 June 1984.During the Khalistan period, various 
armed opposition Sikh groups killed member of the security forces, kidnapped family members of security 
personnel and rich persons, attacked many Hindus and killed anyone they could kill who was politically opposed 
to them. So in order to defend India’s territorial integrity, and to restore law and order, the security forces, 
according to this perspective, had to be powerful enough to crush any violent challenge to the authority of the 
central state. The anti-statist understanding of human rights needs to take this into account. This is because more 
often than not human rights become a tool to discredit the state machinery. However, the period of armed 
conflict not only saw the death of many innocent persons at the hands of both the militants and the state security 
forces, but the legitimate democratic space of the political opposition was usurped in this process.  
 The Punjab crisis was not a simple law and order problem. It was a political problem with social and 
economic roots. The defence of human rights is absolutely critical to the furthering of the economic interests of 
people within and through the democratic process. The prolonged armed conflict affected the political culture of 
Punjab that acquired an anti-human rights predisposition. The articulation of diverse political aspirations in the 
state often met with reluctant accommodation or outright suppression. The enduring nature of Punjab politics 
helps us to understand how human rights can not only be shaped by economic and political interests but also 
how they can profoundly influence those interests as well. Its endurance has been in the alliances as well as 
confrontation between regional and central forces. The political process in the state has been a battle-ground 
against centralization of power in the hands of a single party. 
 This article finds that Punjab has experienced various ups and downs in its political history and human 
rights violations have been a major factor in shaping its politics where democratic forces have been equally 
important. Punjab has witnessed political violence under special circumstances. Its history in between these 
periods has been largely tranquil with few political killings and human rights abuses. It is an interesting contrast 
to West Bengal where human rights violations took place even in normal circumstances and not only in violent 
period of agitations. Punjab’s interests have resided mostly not in political autonomy but in greater financial 
powers so that the state could marshal its share of the national kitty to accelerate its development. Political 
economy has been the driver of many of its political trends. When politics has not degenerated into violent 
conflicts, rather than getting bogged down by partisan politics, Punjab has often found political consensus 
around issues of economic development, no matter how short-lived it has been. Since the end of the Khalistani 
militancy, Punjab has been largely in sync with the Indian federal structure. While it is cavalier to think that 
militant politics would never re-emerge in Punjab, the state’s capacity to absorb political stress and endure 
democratic means in the period since the extirpation of political militancy has been strong enough.46  
  
                                                          
46 Virginia Van Dyke, ‘The Khalistan Movement in Punjab: India and the Post-Militancy Era Structural Change 
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